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George Floyd’s Legacy: Reforming,
Relating, and Rethinking Through
Chauvin’s Conviction and Appeal Under a
Felony-Murder Doctrine LongWeaponized Against People of Color
Greg Egan†
I. Inequity and Evolution: How Police Use of Force and the
Felony-Murder Doctrine Are Poised to Change on the
One-Year Anniversary of George Floyd’s Death
Minnesota’s second-degree felony-murder statute represents a
unique and creative charging mechanism that affords wide
discretion to prosecutors. This makes it ripe for inequitable
application. It is the most serious charge brought against George
Floyd’s killer, Derek Chauvin.1 Prosecutors can find novel ways to
charge felony-murder for almost any unintended death, and they
often use it in cases where they also allege homicidal intent. At the
same time, it is a charge prosecutors can find plausible justification
not to bring in most cases. This wide discretion provides leverage to
prosecutors in plea negotiations. Plea negotiations can work to the
benefit of defendants who are initially charged with second-degree
intentional murder by affording them the opportunity to plead down
to felony-murder, which carries less than half the guideline
sentence.2 This wide charging discretion also has the potential to
unfairly elevate crimes that should have been charged as
manslaughter, third-degree murder, or other lesser offenses. The
discretion can entail a twenty-fold inflation in sentencing over the
†. The Author is a veteran felony trial attorney in the office of the Ramsey
County Public Defender and an adjunct professor at Mitchell Hamline School of Law.
He thanks Anne Bolgert, Abbie Maier, and Andrew Selva not only for their tireless
work as research assistants, but also for their thoughtful analytical insight. The
author also thanks Sam Brower.
1. Complaint at 1, State v. Chauvin, No. 27-CR-20-12646 (Hennepin Cnty. Dist.
Ct. 2020).
2. Sentencing guidelines provide for 306 months for intentional second-degree
murder and 150 months for second-degree felony-murder for an offender with no
criminal history. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES GRID § 4.A (MINNESOTA
SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION 2020). There are recent Minnesota cases
where even defendants indicted for first-degree premeditated murder were allowed
to plead all the way down to second-degree felony-murder. See infra Section II.B.
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charges on which it is commonly predicated.3 For these reasons, the
charging and disposition of felony-murder cases reveal much about
racial disparities in the larger criminal justice system.
The felony-murder doctrine is frequently weaponized against
people of color, while prosecutors and judges allow White
defendants to exploit the doctrine to their benefit. Killings by peace
officers magnify the disparity; officers who should be charged with
felony-murder instead face reduced charges, or more frequently, no
charges at all.4 The victim’s and the killer’s race matter, both in
police killings and in the broader application of the felony-murder
doctrine. This context allows for an informed assessment of the
evolution Minnesota and the world have undergone in the year
since George Floyd’s killing. It also provides a framework for an
analysis of the inevitable appeal of Chauvin’s convictions and the
implications this may have on reform or abolition of the felonymurder doctrine. It situates this prosecution within the affected
community as it moves forward through reform, growth, and unity.
Section II of this Article analyzes sentencings, plea
negotiations, convictions, and charging under Minnesota’s felonymurder doctrine across race, buttressing statistics with examples
and exposing racial inequities in the way the felony-murder
doctrine is deployed. Section III provides a legal analysis of the case
against Philando Castile’s killer, Jeronimo Yanez. While the world
applauded the second-degree manslaughter charge against Yanez,
the case was actually ripe for felony-murder charging. This section
juxtaposes the Yanez case with a more obscure shooting by a
defendant of color who was not a peace officer, illustrating that a
killing by a peace officer can be more egregious, yet not result in
charges of the level faced by a lay person of color. Section IV exposes
how Minnesota peace officers who kill have, until now, rarely been
prosecuted at any level. It provides a brief overview of the only other
four prosecuted Minnesota police killings in recent memory,
reconciling these cases with larger trends and accounting for race.
3. Compare MINN. STAT. § 609.66(1)(a) (2020) (providing for a two-year
statutory maximum penalty for reckless or unlawful intentional discharge of a
firearm), with MINN. STAT. § 609.19(2) (2020) (providing for a forty-year statutory
maximum for second-degree felony-murder). Relative to statutory maximum
comparisons, the disparities are generally less pronounced when it comes to
guideline sentences for common predicate felonies. But they are still marked. An
offender with a criminal history score of zero faces a guideline sentence of twentyone months for second-degree assault and 150 months for second-degree felonymurder. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES GRID § 4.A (MINNESOTA SENTENCING
GUIDELINES COMMISSION 2020). A guideline sentence for an offender with no
criminal history who is convicted of unlawful discharge of a firearm is probation. Id.
4. See infra Section IV.
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The section weighs the implications of Chauvin’s appeal of his
convictions against the broader historical abuses of the felonymurder doctrine. It analyzes the impact these legal proceedings
have on public policy and recognizes their symbolic and social
power, which reframes the hurt, the hope, and the heart of the Twin
Cities community.5
II. The Color of Injustice: Racial Disparities in Charging
and Disposition of Second-Degree Felony-Murder Cases
Defendants of color have different outcomes under the felonymurder doctrine than White defendants. When defendants of color
are charged with more serious murder counts, they are less likely
to be afforded the opportunity to plead down to second-degree
felony-murder.6 Defendants of color are more often convicted of the
most serious charge when the top count is second-degree felonymurder.7 They are statistically more likely to be convicted in
general and are often sentenced more harshly upon conviction. 8
Individual cases across demographics fortify these statistical
trends, making it clear that the felony-murder doctrine has long
been weaponized against people of color, while representing a
relatively lenient alternative for White defendants.
The statistics relied upon in this Article were drawn from a set
of all second-degree felony-murder convictions sentenced from 2012
through 2018 in Ramsey and Hennepin counties, where St. Paul
and Minneapolis are respectively located.9 The data set includes
offenders who initially faced lesser or greater charges, so long as the
conviction was ultimately for second-degree felony-murder. The
statistical set includes cases that were resolved through guilty pleas
as well as trial convictions. The data include the length of sentences,
alongside the guideline sentences. Offender age, gender, and race
are also included. This data set reveals much about the deployment,
effect, and backdrop of Minnesota’s felony-murder rule in
perpetuating racial inequities.

5. The Twin Cities is a colloquialism referring to the greater Minneapolis and
Saint Paul metropolitan region, generally. For the purposes of this Article, Twin
Cities refers to Ramsey and Hennepin counties where the data was gathered from.
6. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, 2ND DEGREE MURDER,
§ 609.19, SUBD. 2(1): SENTENCED 2012–2018 (2020) (on file with author).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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A. Racially Disparate Sentencings
Sentencing statistics across race expose disparities in the
application of the felony-murder doctrine. White defendants
sentenced to second-degree felony-murder in Ramsey and Hennepin
counties from 2012 to 2018 were two-and-a-half times more likely
to receive a shorter-than-guideline sentence relative to a longerthan-guideline sentence.10 Meanwhile, defendants of color received
mitigated and aggravated sentencing departures at roughly the
same rate.11 Judges gave reduced sentences to White defendants 25
percent of the time, compared to 16 percent for defendants of color.12
One White defendant was sentenced to a mere five years for his
involvement in a drug deal where the victim was shot to death. 13
While the defendant did not fire the fatal shots, he was also
armed.14
This disparity is also manifested by cases involving White
defendants committing egregious crimes but receiving guideline
sentences, instead of the aggravated sentences that similarlysituated defendants of color frequently receive. Even after hearing
all the gruesome evidence during a jury trial of a White defendant
who tortured his girlfriend to death, a sentencing judge ordered a
guideline range sentence.15 The defendant had beaten the victim
over her entire body.16 There were scrapes and scratches on her
arms and knees, likely from her attempt to crawl away.17 The
defendant fractured her neck before ultimately choking her to
death.18 He admitted to choking her the night before as well. 19 If
ever a case warranted an aggravated sentencing departure, this one

10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Felony Criminal Complaint at 2–4, State v. Sjostrand, No. 62-CR-18-219
(Ramsey Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2012).
14. Id. at 2–3.
15. Felony Criminal Complaint at 2, State v. Manney, No. 27-CR-11-16860
(Ramsey Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2012).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Like the trial judge, who exercised relative leniency at sentencing,
prosecutors were lenient to this White defendant by declining to seek an indictment
under the domestic abuse provision of the first-degree murder statute. MINN. STAT.
§ 609.185(a)(6) (2010) (providing for culpability when an actor “causes the death of a
human being while committing domestic abuse, when the perpetrator has engaged
in a past pattern of domestic abuse . . . and the death occurs under circumstances
manifesting an extreme indifference to human life”).
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did. However, the White defendant was given a guideline-range
sentence.20
Even when an aggravated sentence is arguably warranted for
a defendant of color,21 it can still be disproportionately harsh and
glaringly out of sync with what similarly-situated White defendants
receive. An Asian defendant received a sentence double the
presumptive sentence for killing a child in his care.22 Sentencing
guideline ranges suggest that he had a criminal history score of
zero.23 Meanwhile, a White woman who suffocated her infant to
death before almost killing a second child the same way received a
sentence of barely half of what the sentencing guidelines
prescribed.24 There should be parity in sentencing across race under
the felony-murder statute, but there is not.
B. Plea Negotiations and Convictions Across Race
On their surface, the racial demographics of second-degree
felony-murder convictions in the Twin Cities support the claim of
widespread racial disparity. Minnesota’s population is
approximately 83.8 percent White.25 A higher concentration of
people of color reside in the St. Paul/Minneapolis metro area,26
which is 77.1 percent White.27 Second-degree felony-murder
conviction statistics do not mirror this demographic data. Between
2012 and 2018, defendants of color accounted for 80.2 percent of
felony-murder convictions, while White defendants accounted for
just 19.8 percent.28 Normalized for demographics, people of color in
20. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, 2ND DEGREE MURDER,
supra note 6.
21. See e.g., Felony Criminal Complaint at 2–3, State v. Meak, No. 62-CR-151070 (Ramsey Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2012). The defendant was alleged to have “rough
housed” a child; semen was found on the child. Id.
22. Id.; MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES GRID § 4 (MINNESOTA SENTENCING
GUIDELINES COMMISSION 2011).
23. See MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES GRID § 4 (MINNESOTA SENTENCING
GUIDELINES COMMISSION 2011).
24. Complaint at 2, State v. Casey, No. 27-CR-13-22282 (Ramsey Cnty. Dist. Ct.
2013); MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, 2ND DEGREE MURDER,
supra note 6.
25. Quick Facts Minnesota, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/
quickfacts/MN [perma.cc/9FXV-D3H2].
26. MINNESOTA
STATE
DEMOGRAPHIC
CENTER,
DEPARTMENT
OF
ADMINISTRATION, AGE, RACE, & ETHNICITY (2018), https://mn.gov/admin/
demography/data-by-topic/age-race-ethnicity/ [perma.cc/6H2L-GUYN].
27. Race and Ethnicity in the Minneapolis Area (Metro Area), CEDAR LAKE
VENTURES, INC. (Sept. 14, 2018) (citing U.S. Census data), https://statistical
atlas.com/metro-area/Minnesota/Minneapolis/Race-and-Ethnicity [perma.cc/7Z539F8N].
28. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, 2ND DEGREE MURDER,
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the Twin Cities are statistically twelve times more likely to be
convicted of second-degree felony-murder.29
More troubling than the racial distribution of second-degree
felony-murder convictions is the disparity in what the convictions
reflect in the shadow of the original charges. The overwhelming
majority of convictions are the result of plea negotiations. 30 Indeed,
negotiated plea deals have become the vehicle by which most
criminal cases are resolved around the country.31 66.7 percent of the
White defendants convicted of second-degree felony-murder in
Minnesota were initially charged or indicted with more serious
levels of homicide.32 For White defendants, a guilty plea to seconddegree felony-murder most often represents generous resolution
relative to the exposure under the original complaint or indictment.
White defendants in the Twin Cities routinely benefit by pleading
down to second-degree felony-murder.
Conviction statistics under the second-degree felony-murder
doctrine present the opposite trend for defendants of color.
Defendants of color sentenced to second-degree felony-murder had
their charges reduced in only 38.5 percent of cases.33 For the rest of
the defendants of color, their second-degree felony-murder
conviction represented the most serious count.34 The plea
bargaining statistics reveal a striking racial disparity: White
defendants plead to reduced felony-murder charges at nearly double
the rate of defendants of color.
Inequities run deeper than statistically tilted plea
negotiations. The facts of individual cases, as alleged in the criminal
complaints, best illustrate two parallel yet unenviable trends.
White defendants are frequently punished leniently, while
defendants of color receive harsher treatment even when the facts
support opposite outcomes.

supra note 6.
29. Id.
30. See id.
31. INNOCENCE PROJECT, REPORT: GUILTY PLEAS ON THE RISE, CRIMINAL TRIALS
ON THE DECLINE (Aug. 7, 2018), https://innocenceproject.org/guilty-pleas-on-the-risecriminal-trials-on-the-decline/ [perma.cc/9TSN-B7QH]; NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF.
LAWYERS, THE TRIAL PENALTY REPORT 14 (2018), https://www.nacdl.org/
getattachment/95b7f0f5-90df-4f9f-9115-520b3f58036a/the-trial-penalty-the-sixthamendment-right-to-trial-on-the-verge-of-extinction-and-how-to-save-it.pdf
[perma.cc/7P42-YC7F].
32. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, 2ND DEGREE MURDER,
supra note 6.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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A robbery involving six codefendants that left a young man
dead illustrates this disturbing trend. Two of the codefendants were
Black, and four were White.35 While all six were initially indicted
for first-degree murder,36 the four White codefendants were
permitted to plead guilty to a reduced charge under the inherently
pliable second-degree felony-murder rule.37 The Black defendant
who fired the gun pled to second-degree intentional murder.38 While
the Black codefendant who did not fire the gun pled guilty to seconddegree felony-murder, he received a harsher-than-guideline
sentence.39 The White codefendants all received sentences within
guideline sentence range for second-degree felony-murder.40 None
of the four White codefendants received consecutive sentences; both
of the Black codefendants did.41
According to the complaint and newspaper coverage of the
incident, five of the codefendants hatched a detailed plan to break
into their drug dealer’s apartment to steal drugs and take back a
gaming system.42 Newspaper coverage reported that at least part of
the group was intent on “beating the [expletive] out of [the drug
dealer] then taking everything.”43 The same source recounted an
agreement to split what they burglarized, “since it’s a group deal.” 44
The sixth codefendant was reportedly recruited to bring a gun; he
“made sure it was loaded.” 45 As a car waited outside, four of the
codefendants burst into the apartment, according to the criminal
complaint.46 Some reportedly ransacked it searching for drugs,
35. Id.
36. Brandon Stahl, Suburban Women Plead Guilty to Murder for Their Role in
Drug Robbery-Turned Slaying, STAR TRIB. (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.star
tribune.com/suburban-women-plead-guilty-to-murder-for-their-role-in-drugrobbery-turned-slaying/470561553/ [perma.cc/3E24-VC8B].
37. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, 2ND DEGREE MURDER,
supra note 6.
38. Id.
39. Id. While he pled down to second-degree unintentional felony-murder like
the White codefendants, his sentence was 24 percent higher than prescribed in the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. Id.; MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES GRID
§ 4.A (MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION 2017).
40. Id.; MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, 2ND DEGREE
MURDER, supra note 6.
41. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, 2ND DEGREE MURDER,
supra note 6.
42. Complaint at 3, State v. Peterson, No. 27-CR-17-10674 (Hennepin Cnty. Dist.
Ct. 2018).
43. Stahl, supra note 36.
44. Id.
45. Id.; Complaint at 3, State v. Peterson, No. 27-CR-17-10674 (Hennepin Cnty.
Dist. Ct. 2018).
46. Complaint at 3, State v. Peterson, No. 27-CR-17-10674 (Hennepin Cnty. Dist.
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yelling and swearing at the victim, while others attacked the
decedent and “pistol whipped” him.47 The complaint further
recounts that they forced the decedent’s girlfriend onto a bed,
pointed the gun at her head, and told her they would kill her if she
left the bedroom.48 She described holding the decedent as “he took
his last breath.”49 The decedent was shot in the neck; the bullet
grazed his jugular vein, shattered his spine, and fractured his
skull.50 Prosecutors also noted blunt force trauma to his head and
face.51 The codefendants reportedly left him there and fled with the
drugs.52
Although it may be argued that lesser charges are warranted
because the White codefendants did not actually pull the trigger,53
it is a well-established tenet of Minnesota criminal law that
accomplices are liable for the conduct of the principal at the same
level.54 Even so, the disparity in sentencing under the same
statutory subsection remains: the Black codefendant who did not
pull the trigger received a significantly harsher sentence than the
Ct. 2018).
47. Complaint at 3, State v. Peterson, No. 27-CR-17-10674 (Hennepin Cnty. Dist.
Ct. 2018).
48. Stahl, supra note 36.
49. Complaint at 3, State v. Peterson, No. 27-CR-17-10674 (Hennepin Cnty. Dist.
Ct. 2018); David Chanen, Mother of Slain Teen Laments A Wasted Life Over Drugs,
Mistakes, STAR TRIB. (Apr. 7, 2018), https://www.startribune.com/mother-of-slainteen-laments-a-wasted-life-over-drugs-mistakes/479024163/ [perma.cc/4XD3-6ZTX].
50. Complaint at 3, State v. Peterson, No. 27-CR-17-10674 (Hennepin Cnty. Dist.
Ct. 2018).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Admittedly, some legal scholars have taken issue with this tenet, arguing
that an accomplice should not bear full liability for the actions of the principal actor.
See Michael Heyman, Losing All Sense of Just Proportion: The Peculiar Law of
Accomplice Liability, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 129 (2013); Sherif Girgis, The Mens Rea
of Accomplice Liability: Supporting Intentions, 123 YALE L.J. 266 (2013); Joshua
Dressler, Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice Liability: New
Solutions to an Old Problem, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 91 (1985).
54. State v. Ezeka, 946 N.W.2d 393, 407 (Minn. 2020) (citing MINN. STAT.
§ 609.05(1) (2018)); State v. Whitman, 114 N.W. 363, 364 (Minn. 1908). It is notable
that in at least one U.S. jurisdiction, “[f]or all intents and purposes the ‘seconddegree felony-murder’ rule for accomplices has been abolished.” CAL. STATE SENATE,
FACT SHEET FOR SENATE BILL 1437 (2018); see also People v. Cruz, 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d
166, 169 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020) (citing CAL. STAT. ch. 1015, § 1 (2018) (explaining that
“to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual
killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life”). If Minnesota
had a similar limitation, the five codefendants who did not fire the fatal shot may
not have been convicted of second-degree felony-murder. Other states align with
Minnesota in holding accomplices fully liable under the felony-murder doctrine. See,
e.g., State v. Chambers, 515 N.W.2d 531, 533 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Blair,
228 P.3d 564, 568 (Ore. 2010); State v. Rios, 172 P.3d 844, 846 (Ariz. 2007).
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four similarly-situated White codefendants. The felony-murder rule
should not be contorted to reach inequitable outcomes.
While advocates for the White codefendants may argue that
they were actually treated too harshly, in reality, they reaped the
benefit of the second-degree felony murder rule, considering that
the facts could have yielded a conviction under a far more serious
variant of the doctrine. Under Minnesota law, both the first and
second-degree murder statutes have a provision for felonymurder.55 Burglary is among the predicate felonies specifically
enumerated in the first-degree felony-murder statute.56 Ample facts
alleged in the complaints would support this predicate offense. 57 Yet
prosecutors were content with a conviction under the lesser seconddegree felony-murder provision. Their decision transformed
potential first-degree felony-murder life sentences into seconddegree felony-murder sentences as short as twelve and a half
years.58
While the author does not contend that life sentences would be
just in this case, an analytical juxtaposition of the second-degree
and first-degree felony-murder rules illustrates the wide-ranging
homicidal liability that exists on strikingly similar facts. Such
discretion perpetuates further inequity in plea negotiations, trials,
and sentencings, leaving a system ripe for abuse and incapable of
delivering racial equity. This example exposes the reasons that both
first-degree and second-degree felony-murder should be excised
from Minnesota’s statutory and common law schemes. Doing so will
leave a set of thoughtfully-tiered laws, accounting for all levels of
homicidal and less-than-homicidal liability,59 and it will create a
construct under which these six codefendants, Black and White,
could have been equitably charged or indicted, negotiated with,
tried, and sentenced.

55. See MINN. STAT. § 609.185(a)(3) (2016); MINN. STAT. § 609.19(2)(1) (2016).
56. See MINN. STAT. § 609.185(a)(3) (2016). The Supreme Court of Minnesota
recognizes first-degree felony-murder prosecutions predicated on burglary. See, e.g.,
State v. Mosley, 853 N.W.2d 789, 794 (Minn. 2014).
57. See Complaint at 3, State v. Peterson, No. 27-CR-17-10674 (Hennepin Cnty.
Dist. Ct. 2018) (alleging on its face burglary while possessing a firearm as the
predicate felony).
58. MINN. STAT. § 609.19(1)(1) (2016); MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES
COMMISSION, 2ND DEGREE MURDER, supra note 6.
59. Absent the felony-murder doctrine, the Minnesota Legislature has erected a
thoughtful, effective, and wide-ranging statutory scheme that aptly addresses all
unjustified killings, ranging from second-degree manslaughter, MINN. STAT.
§ 609.205(1) (2020) to third degree murder, MINN. STAT. § 609.195(a) (2020), to
second-degree intentional murder, MINN. STAT. § 609.19(1)(1) (2020), to first-degree
murder, MINN. STAT. § 609.185(a)(1) (2020).
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While it is easy to criticize prosecutors who apply the felonymurder doctrine in racially inequitable ways, one should not
overlook that it is the theoretical underpinnings of Minnesota’s
felony-murder doctrines that enable them to do so. Minnesota’s
statutory schemes provide the architecture for convictions under
statutory provisions with guideline sentences ranging from just
over ten years to life in prison for essentially the same conduct. Both
the theory and application of Minnesota’s felony-murder doctrines
must be repaired or repealed if the disparities cannot be reconciled.
As the law stands now, felony-murder makes for faux plea
negotiations, and as exemplified below, unjust charging. These are
the byproducts of the unconscionably wide prosecutorial discretion
inherent in the doctrine.
C. Charging Discretion Ripe for Abuse
White defendants frequently benefit from the felony-murder
doctrine, while defendants of color have a markedly different
experience. Just as this disparity is painfully apparent in plea
negotiations and conviction trends, it also manifests in charging
decisions. Even when prosecutors ultimately amend their charges,
initial charging decisions reveal further racial inequity. These
decisions inarguably impact the course of individual prosecutions,
even when cases gravitate away from the initial charges. It is the
stunningly wide discretion inherent in Minnesota’s felony-murder
doctrine, in the abstract, that sustains racially inequitable charging
practices.
Defendants of color may face aggressive felony-murder
charges for facts that should not warrant murder prosecutions at
all. According to a criminal complaint and newspaper reports, a
Black Minneapolis man had a dispute with his brother. 60 Isolated
in the basement, the victim shot the defendant. 61 Witnesses say
they heard three shots, and the defendant shouted out, “my brother
just shot me.”62 It was only then that the defendant returned fire. 63
His defensive gunshots killed his brother only after the defendant
himself received multiple gunshot wounds.64
In their criminal complaint, prosecutors strained to justify
their second-degree felony-murder charge by noting that the
60.
2018).
61.
62.
63.
64.

Complaint at 3, State v. Clark, No. 27-CR-18-4772 (Hennepin Cnty. Dist. Ct.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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victim’s firearm was only “a small gun,”65 as if to imply that the
bullets fired from it did not have lethal potential. It is also
noteworthy that prosecutors acknowledged that it was the victim
who pursued the defendant into the basement, where, cornered,
they exchanged gunfire.66 Self-defense would have negated the
second-degree assault on which the felony-murder charge was
predicated.67 Legal scholars have advanced compelling arguments
as to why most assaults should not be viable predicate felonies; most
states have adapted their laws accordingly.68 Charging prosecutors
were almost certainly aware of this fracture in the legal and
academic communities. But that did not prevent them from
bringing murder charges against this Black defendant.
The felony-murder charge was not, however, enough for
prosecutors: they went a step further by also bringing the grossly
inflated charge of second-degree intentional murder.69 The result
was a leveraging of plea negotiations to extract a plea to what
appears a lesser count of second-degree felony-murder. This
prosecutorial tool creates an artificial middle count used to extort
guilty pleas from people of color who are actually liable of lesser
crimes, or no crime at all.
Stretching the second-degree felony-murder doctrine to charge
and convict this Black defendant is not an isolated occurrence.
Another Black man left to care for his girlfriend’s infant children
was convicted of second-degree felony-murder, primarily for failing
to seek medical care for an infant’s burned wrist and instead giving
him too much over-the-counter medicine, which doctors opined may
have had an unintended sedative effect.70 In attending to the child,
the defendant had wrapped the child’s wrist,71 which likely would
have made it difficult to assess the severity of the burn. This should

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. MINN. STAT. § 609.065 (2006) (characterizing “justifiable taking of life” as
occurring “when necessary in resisting or preventing an offense which the actor
reasonably believes exposes the actor or another to great bodily harm or death”).
68. Greg Egan, Collateral and Independent Felonious Design: A Call to Adopt a
Tempered Merger Limitation for Predicate Felonies of Assault Under a Minnesota
Felony-Murder Doctrine Currently ‘Too Productive of Injustice’, 44 MITCHELL
HAMLINE L. REV., no. 5, 2018, at 98 (advocating adoption of a merger limitation to
Minnesota’s felony-murder doctrine, which would make most assaults inviable as
predicate felonies).
69. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, 2ND DEGREE MURDER,
supra note 6.
70. Complaint at 2–3, State v. Todd, No. 27-CR-12-17771 (Hennepin Cnty. Dist.
Ct. 2012).
71. Id. at 2.
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have been significant to charging attorneys, because the specific
cause of death was a blood infection from the burn. 72
There were injuries consistent with child abuse, which
prosecutors implicitly speculated the defendant had caused. 73 But
they also acknowledged that more than a dozen other people resided
in a home containing rotting food, dead animals, and overall filthy
conditions.74 The complaint further acknowledged a potential
accidental fall down the stairs,75 but prosecutors refused to concede
that this could have accounted for some of the injuries noted in the
autopsy. Regardless of the source or intentionality of the injuries,
the cause of death was listed as “complications from neglect.”76
In assessing the fairness of attributing fatal neglect to the
defendant, prosecutors should have considered several factors. The
defendant, who was twenty years old, was the only one in the house
who took any responsibility for caring for the children under
intensely challenging circumstances.77 He described having to feed
the children nonperishable food and being relegated to a small room
in the basement.78 The defendant’s mother was upset at him for
having the children in the house, but that did not stop her from
leaving additional young children in his care when she too left the
home for an unspecified amount of time.79 The defendant had made
scores of phone calls to the children’s mother; she ignored them all,
so he did not know if or when she would return. 80 Furthermore,
when she finally returned, she was with the children during the
hours immediately before it became known that the infant was
dead; the infant did not die while in the defendant’s care.81
Rather than focusing on those facts, the charging prosecutor
focused on the allegation that the defendant left the children
sleeping in a crib for an hour before their mother finally returned
so he could go to the store—likely to buy food for the children.82
Prosecutors make no mention of which, or how many, adults were
in the house for the hour during which he did not, allegedly,

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 3.
Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id. 1–2.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
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“arrange for supervision.”83 A second-degree felony-murder
conviction for this young Black defendant represents a miscarriage
of justice, and it stands in stark contrast to the manner in which
the doctrine is generally employed in cases charged against White
defendants.
Even when later amended, initial charging decisions often
reflect deference to White defendants ultimately convicted of
second-degree felony-murder. Two men were shot to death at a St.
Paul motel because one of them allegedly owed a codefendant
$1,000.84 The White defendant drove the killer to the hotel, knocked
on the door, then helped force entry.85 He watched as several shots
were fired, then the victims bled to death in the parking lot and on
a nearby roadway.86 After the defendant fled in his car, he later
picked up the shooter and other codefendant and drove them
further away from the scene while they plotted their stories to avoid
incriminating one another.87 Police found the two lifeless bodies and
quickly apprehended the defendant.88 Yet prosecutors effectively
ignored both deaths when making their initial charging decision:
they charged the White defendant only with aiding and abetting
attempted first-degree aggravated robbery and aiding and abetting
attempted simple robbery.89 These offenses carry statutory
maximum sentences of just ten and five years, respectively.90
Prosecutors failed to charge second-degree felony-murder
initially.91 The Black codefendant who was not the gunman in this
case was sentenced to the statutory maximum: forty years in
prison.92 The White codefendant was sentenced to just over twelve
83. Id. at 1–4.
84. Felony Criminal Complaint at 3, State v. Benner, No. 62-CR-16-2156
(Ramsey Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2016).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 4.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1–2.
90. MINN. STAT. § 609.245(1) (2014); MINN. STAT. § 609.24 (2014).
91. Felony Criminal Complaint at 3, State v. Benner, No. 62-CR-16-2156
(Ramsey Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2016).
Defendants of color are routinely charged with felony-murder from the onset of
prosecution for similar or even less serious robberies resulting in unintended deaths.
See, e.g., Complaint at 3, State v. Smith, No. 27-CR-14-1327 (Hennepin Cnty. Dist.
Ct. 2014); Criminal Felony Complaint at 2–3, State v. Calloway, No 62- CR-16-6907
(Ramsey Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2016); Criminal Felony Complaint at 3, State v. Smith, No.
62-CR-16-6906 (Ramsey Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2016); Complaint at 2–3, State v. Foresta,
No. 27-CR-13-25524 (Hennepin Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2014); Complaint at 3, State v.
Turner, No. 27-CR-13-25523 (Hennepin Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2013).
92. MINN. STAT. § 609.19(1) (2014). Sarah Horner, He Didn’t Pull the Trigger,
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years.93 The initial decisions impact trial preparation,
investigations, plea negotiations, and sentencings—further
propelling racial inequities.
The Twin Cites has an unadmirable history in the disposition
of second-degree felony-murder cases. The record is ripe with
disheartening examples of White defendants benefiting from the
felony-murder doctrine, while defendants of color receive draconian
treatment. The racial inequities manifest in charging, plea
negotiations, conviction levels, and sentencings. Nearly a decade of
statistics support these findings. In the abstract, the felony-murder
doctrine is strained, artificial, and unfair. The archaic doctrine’s
application magnifies its flaws. The felony-murder doctrine
exacerbates racial inequities and should be overhauled or
altogether abolished.
III. Culpable Negligence or Reckless Intent: A Case Study
in the Charging of a Peace Officer and an Indigent Man
of Color
A police shooting and a shooting by an indigent person of color
occurred in recent years in Ramsey County; though similar in
factual consequence, they quickly took on very different legal
complexions. In 2016, after months of deliberation, Ramsey County
prosecutors made a charging decision in a high-profile police
shooting. 94 The victim was a Black school cafeteria worker,
Philando Castile.95 The defendant was a veteran of the St. Anthony
Police Department, Jeronimo Yanez.96 Castile had been driving
But He Gets 40 Years, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.twin
cities.com/2017/02/08/st-paul-man-gets-40-years-for-midway-area-double-murder/
[perma.cc/8UQC-8CF3].
93. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, 2ND DEGREE MURDER,
supra note 6.
94. See generally John Choi, Ramsey Cnty. Att’y, Remarks Regarding the Hiring
of a Special Prosecutor to Assist in the Philando Castile Matter (July 29, 2016),
https://www.ramseycounty.us/sites/default/files/County%20Attorney/County%20Att
orney%20transcribed%20remarks%207%2029%2016.pdf
[perma.cc/3H2V-BHSX]
(stressing the importance of being “thoughtful and deliberate” in order to “provide
the legitimacy this case requires and deserves”). The charging decision was
announced more than four months after the incident. See Press Release, Office of the
Ramsey County Attorney, Ramsey County Attorney Announces Criminal Charges
Against Police Officer in Death of Philando Castile, RAMSEY CNTY. ATT’Y’S OFF. (Nov.
16, 2016), https://www.ramseycounty.us/sites/default/files/County%20Attorney/
11.16.16%20County%20Attorney%20Remarks%20as%20Prepared%20for%20Delive
ry%20in%20Yanez%20Case_0.pdf [perma.cc/UQ8S-MDVK]; Felony Criminal
Complaint at 7, State v. Yanez, No. 0620373879 (Ramsey Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2017).
95. Mitch Smith, Officer Cleared in 2016 Killing of Black Driver, N.Y. TIMES at
A1 (June 16, 2017).
96. Id.
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with his girlfriend and her young daughter when Yanez pulled the
car over for a broken brake light.97 Castile “calmly” told the officer
that he had a firearm; he also had a valid permit to carry.98 Yanez
suddenly fired seven times into the car, killing Castile and nearly
striking his girlfriend and the child. 99 Prosecutors charged Yanez
with second-degree manslaughter and intentional discharge of a
firearm that endangers safety.100
The same office charged a more obscure case nearly a decade
earlier against a nineteen-year-old Mexican immigrant, Alfredo
“Freddy” Gutierrez-Gonzales, who was mishandling a rifle on the
front porch of a house.101 When Gutierrez-Gonzales heard someone
approaching, he put the rifle down. 102 His friend called out, “Don’t
trip, it’s just me.”103 As Gutierrez-Gonzales picked the rifle back up,
it suddenly went off.104 The bullet struck his friend, who was White,
in the head; he died at the scene. 105 Prosecutors did not dispute that
the rifle going off was anything other than a tragic accident. 106
Within days, prosecutors charged Gutierrez-Gonzales with seconddegree felony-murder.107 The peace officer and the young man of
color faced markedly different consequences.
The felony-murder charge in the Gutierrez-Gonzales case
rested on a legally unstable foundation. The criminal complaint
clearly enumerated the predicate felony: reckless discharge of a
firearm within a municipality.108 Unlike most other viable predicate
felonies, which require intentional or knowing levels of mens rea to
trigger felony-murder prosecutions,109 the predicate felony in the
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Felony Criminal Complaint at 7, State v. Yanez, No. 0620373879 (Ramsey
Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2017).
101. Felony Criminal Complaint at 1–3, State v. Gutierrez-Gonzales, No. 62-CR08-16753 (Ramsey Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2008).
102. Id. at 3.
103. State’s Memorandum of Law, State v. Gutierrez-Gonzales, No. 62-CR-0816753 (Ramsey Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2008).
104. Felony Criminal Complaint at 3, State v. Gutierrez-Gonzales, No. 62-CR-0816753 (Ramsey County District Court 2008).
105. Id.; Mara Gottfried, Girlfriend of Suspected Shooter: ‘Turn Yourself In . . . ’,
ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Nov. 16, 2008), https://www.twincities.com/2008/11/16/
girlfriend-of-suspected-shooter-turn-yourself-in/ [perma.cc/5SLC-NHDX].
106. Felony Criminal Complaint at 3, State v. Gutierrez-Gonzales, No. 62-CR-0816753 (Ramsey Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2008).
107. Id. at 5.
108. Id. at 1.
109. See, e.g., Butala v. State, 887 N.W.2d 826, 831 (Minn. 2016) (establishing
that arson is a viable predicate felony); MINN. STAT. § 609.561(1) (2020) (specifying
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case against Gutierrez-Gonzales required only reckless mens rea.110
Although under Minnesota common law, offenses with reckless
mens rea—or even strict liability—are technically viable predicate
felonies,111 this charging vehicle stretches the theoretical
framework of the felony-murder doctrine, which is premised on
imputed intent, and has come under harsh criticism.112
In State v. Engle, decided just months before GutierrezGonzales was charged, the Supreme Court of Minnesota assessed
the mens rea requirement for reckless discharge of a firearm within
a municipality as a standalone offense.113 The Engle Court noted
ambiguity in whether the reckless mens rea required the voluntary
act of pulling the trigger, or merely any voluntary act that
“increases the likelihood that the gun will discharge
accidentally.”114 The Engle Court concluded that any “conscious or
intentional act in connection with the discharge of a firearm”
satisfies the mens rea element.115
a mens rea requirement of “intentionally” for the predicate felony of arson); State v.
Dorn, 887 N.W.2d 826, 831 (Minn. 2016) (requiring that the actor knowingly or
intentionally commit the predicate assault to trigger the felony-murder doctrine)
(cited in Egan, Collateral and Independent Felonious Design, supra note 68
(analyzing the general intent crime of first-degree assault as a Minnesota predicate
felony, contrasting it to the elevated mens rea threshold of specific intent assault
required to trigger felony-murder under Ohio law)).
110. MINN. STAT. § 609.66(1)(a)(3) (2006); see generally State v. Engle, 743 N.W.2d
595 (Minn. 2008) (developing mens rea required for reckless discharge of a firearm
in a municipality).
111. See State v. Smoot, 737 N.W.2d 849, 853–855 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007) (holding
that felony Driving While Impaired, a strict liability offense, may serve as a viable
predicate felony in felony-murder prosecutions).
112. Interview with Professor George M. Platt, University of Oregon School of
Law (Nov. 14, 1969) (cited in State v. Blair, 214 P.3d 47, 57 (Oregon Ct. App. 2009)
(stressing “we have approached the outer limits of the mens rea requirement with
respect to murder in the felony-murder doctrine. In effect what we have is strict
liability when one who sets out to commit a lesser felony with no mens rea—with no
mental element of intending to kill anyone—winds up as a murderer . . . .[T]here will
be a door through which the very unusual defendant will be able to exit from the
charge of murder”)).
113. State v. Engle, 743 N.W.2d 592 (Minn. 2008).
114. Id. at 595–96 (Minn. 2008) (cited in State v. Coleman, 944 N.W.2d 469, 478
(Minn. Ct. App. 2020) (defining reckless mens rea but applying it to third-degree
murder)).
115. State v. Engle, 743 N.W.2d at 596. It should not be lost on the reader that
the defendant in Engle, a private security guard, was acting in a quasi-law
enforcement capacity. Id. at 593. While the race of the victim is unclear from the
published appellate court opinion, it is clear that Mr. Engle shooting and paralyzing
the victim was not justified. Id. Notwithstanding the horrific consequences of the
shooting, Mr. Engle was not charged with attempted murder or even assault, and
the sentencing judge imposed a mere two years of probation after which the
conviction was to be reduced to a misdemeanor. Id. Rare are the cases where a lay
person of color receives the benefit of such generous charging or sentencing.
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Arguably, the law just months before Gutierrez-Gonzales was
charged required a deliberate, volitional trigger pull. 116 The
complaint did not allege one.117 Still, prosecutors rushed to charge
Gutierrez-Gonzales with felony-murder. More unnerving,
prosecutors made no attempt to satisfy even the lower post-Engle
mens rea threshold. They failed to plead any voluntary acts by
Gutierrez-Gonzales that would have “increase[d] the likelihood that
the gun will discharge accidentally.”118 The only facts alleged in the
complaint relating to Gutierrez-Gonzales’ handling the rifle are
“trying to put a clip in” and “pick[ing] the gun back up” after
“put[ting] the gun down.”119 This is routine conduct that peace
officers across the nation engage in every day without criticism; yet
it is the sole alleged misconduct on which Gutierrez-Gonzales’
felony-murder charge hinged.
The same office declined to utilize a similar predicate felony
against Yanez. Prosecutors had to have realized that such a
charging option was available; the potential predicate felony was
evident as counts two and three on the very face of the complaint:
intentional discharge of a firearm that endangers safety.120 The
mens rea for the would-be predicate felony was intentional.121 If
reckless discharge of a firearm could predicate felony-murder
charges in the case against Gutierrez-Gonzales, certainly
intentional discharge of a firearm could serve as a predicate felony
in the case against Yanez. Intentional discharge of a firearm is a
more legally sound predicate felony because of its heightened mens
rea requirement. Charging second-degree felony-murder would
have recalibrated plea negotiations, trial strategy, and the way
jurors viewed the evidence. It may have even led to a guilty plea or
a different verdict at trial.
The facts only bolster the case for a felony-murder charge
against Yanez. He deliberately aimed his firearm in the direction of
Castile and the other two occupants of the vehicle, and with full
volitional control, pulled the trigger no less than seven times. 122
116. See generally id.
117. Felony Criminal Complaint at 3, State v. Gutierrez-Gonzales, No. 62-CR-0816753 (Ramsey Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2008) (alleging the “gun suddenly went off . . . the
shooting was an accident”).
118. See Engle, 743 N.W.2d at 596.
119. Felony Criminal Complaint at 3, State v. Gutierrez-Gonzales, No. 62-CR-0816753 (Ramsey Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2008).
120. Felony Criminal Complaint at 1–2, State v. Yanez, No. 0620373879 (Ramsey
Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2017).
121. MINN. STAT. § 609.66(1)(a)(2) (2006).
122. Smith, supra note 95.
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Obviously, prosecutors thought they had a strong case for unlawful
intentional discharge of a firearm, otherwise they would not have
charged Yanez with those two counts. But they failed to take the
next step and bring the felony-murder charge, even though the only
additional element of proof they would have needed was not in
dispute: Philando Castile’s lifeless body.
The Yanez prosecutors may argue that it was a legitimate
exercise of discretion not to charge felony-murder. That discretion
is precisely the problem: it so rarely gets used to the detriment of
peace officers and is so often weaponized against people of color. 123
Regardless of whether it was Yanez’s status as a peace officer or the
race of the victims that differentiated the charging in the two cases,
this disparity exemplifies unconscionable systemic bias in the
prosecution of police killings and killings by civilian people of color.
If prosecutors cannot harmonize their charging decisions across
these demographics, the felony-murder doctrine should be
abolished.
IV. George Floyd’s Legacy: Lasting Reform and a Shifting
Social Prism in Anticipation of Appellate Review of
Minnesota’s Felony-Murder Doctrine
The distorted approach to police killings, coupled with larger
systemic racial bias, has plagued the Twin Cities’ handling of
felony-murder cases, other homicides, and crime more generally. In
the four years between the Castile and Floyd killings, Minnesota
prosecutors brought charges against peace officers on just two other
occasions.124 In that time there were forty-seven on-duty police
killings in the state.125 The problem goes back much further: from
2000–2016, the Office of the Hennepin County Attorney did not
bring charges in a single police shooting.126 The racial inequity of
123. See supra Section II; see also Greg Egan, Opinion, Minnesota Needs to
Change Its ‘Felony-Murder’ Doctrine. Racial Inequities Are One Reason, ST. PAUL
PIONEER PRESS at 19A (June 28, 2020).
124. Pat Borzi, Why Are Cops in Minnesota So Rarely Charged in Officer-Involved
Deaths?, MINNPOST (June 1, 2020), https://www.minnpost.com/metro/2020/06/whyare-cops-in-minnesota-so-rarely-charged-in-officer-involved-deaths/
[perma.cc/2STM-WX7G].
125. Jeff Hargarten, Jennifer Bjorhus, MaryJo Webster, & Kelly Smith, Every
Police-Involved Death in Minnesota Since 2000, STAR TRIB. (Oct. 2, 2020),
https://www.startribune.com/fatal-police-encounters-since-2000/502088871/
[perma.cc/C7PV-EPNG].
126. Tom Jackman & Devlin Barrett, Charging Officers with Crimes is Still
Difficult for Prosecutors, WASH. POST (May 29, 2020), https://www.washington
post.com/crime-law/2020/05/29/charging-cops-with-crimes-is-still-difficultprosecutors/ [perma.cc/WM2V-Z7ZD].
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that approach and the tacit acceptance of the devastation,
dehumanization, and terror it encompasses have deeply scarred the
community. The Chauvin conviction and appellate posture may
cultivate justice in two conflicting ways: either upholding a measure
of accountability against Floyd’s killer in a way that catalyzes
community healing, or, alternatively, prompting a legal change in a
way that would, unfortunately, lessen this killer’s punishment but
facilitate new law benefiting the long-abused community he has so
deeply scarred.
The prosecution of George Floyd’s killer stands apart from
even the other exceedingly rare cases charged against peace
officers. It is a sign of progress, but it also evidences just how far
things had deteriorated. The other recent Minnesota police killings,
while driven in part by their unique factual circumstances, still
mirror the racial inequities evident in second-degree felony-murder
prosecutions more generally. They also reflect a basic deference to
peace officers. A Washington County Sheriff’s deputy, Brian Krook,
was recently indicted for second-degree manslaughter for shooting
a young man in the midst of a mental health crisis.127 The victim
was a White, off-duty Emergency Medical Technician.128 The
victim’s race and occupation likely motivated prosecutors to seek
the indictment. In addition, there tends to be greater sympathy for
victims suffering from a mental health crisis.129 Under these
circumstances, even though Krook was also White, prosecutors
went to the grand jury. They did not, however, go so far as to
recommend a felony-murder charge. One can speculate as to
whether prosecutors would have pursued felony-murder had the
shooting involved an officer of color. Conversely, had the victim been
a person of color, an indictment may not have been sought at all.
What appear to be surface inroads towards justice in the Krook
prosecution are nuanced and may actually be yet another
manifestation of racial inequity. This is an inequity challenged—
but not eviscerated—by the conviction of Floyd’s killer.
The Krook case stands in stark contrast to the most recent
prosecuted police shooting in Minnesota leading up to George
Floyd’s killing, but that does not mean that it harmonizes with the

127. Summons at 1, State v. Krook, No. 82-CR-19-2887 (Washington Cnty. Dist.
Ct. 2019); Matt Sepic, Washington Co. Deputy Says he Felt ‘Horrible’ After Shooting,
Killing a Man Threatening Suicide, MINN. PUB. RADIO NEWS (Mar. 18, 2020),
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2020/03/17/washington-co-deputy-says-he-felthorrible-after-shooting-a-suicidal-man-to-death [perma.cc/3AS4-9RR2].
128. Id.
129. Hargarten et al., supra note 125.
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Chauvin case when it comes to racial justice and policing. Mohamed
Noor was a Black, Somali-American Minneapolis police officer who,
in the dark of night, shot and killed a White woman. 130 While
initially Noor was charged with third-degree murder and seconddegree manslaughter,131 prosecutors later elevated charges,
bypassing second-degree felony-murder to charge Noor with seconddegree intentional murder.132 Although bringing criminal charges—
perhaps even a felony-murder charge—was appropriate,
intentional murder was a stretch.133 There was no body camera
footage and no incriminating statement by Noor.134 His charges far
exceeded those that Yanez and Krook faced. Noor’s was the only one
of the three cases where an officer of color killed a White victim, so
the charging and outcome of that case should not be wholeheartedly celebrated.
Just a few miles from the courthouse where Chauvin’s trial
was still drawing to its conclusion, yet another young Black man
was gunned down by a White peace officer, Kimberly Potter.135
Daunte Wright had been pulled over for expired license plate tabs,
allegedly tried to flee, and was shot because Potter somehow
thought she was handling a taser instead of a firearm. 136 A County
Attorney promptly charged the officer with Second-Degree
Manslaughter, and Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison

130. Libor Jany, Ex-Minneapolis Police Officer Noor to Plead Not Guilty in
Damond Shooting Death, STAR TRIB. (April 26, 2008), https://www.startribune.com/
minneapolis-police-officer-mohamed-noor-will-plead-not-guilty-in-shooting-deathof-justine-damond/480845391/ [perma.cc/9SZJ-RWGS].
131. Complaint at 1, State v. Noor, No. 27-CR-18-6859 (Hennepin Cnty. Dist. Ct.
2018).
132. Second-Degree Murder Charge Officially Added to Noor Complaint, 5
EYEWITNESS NEWS KSTP (Mar. 26, 2019), [web.archive.org/web/20200614165049/
https://kstp.com/news/second-degree-murder-charge-officially-added-mohamednoor-complaint/5175413/].
133. In its statutory amendments in the wake of George Floyd’s killing, the
Minnesota Legislature recognized a more nuanced mental state required for
prosecution of an officer in Noor’s position, which in some ways validated his defense.
Compare MINN. STAT. § 609.066(1)(1) (2016) (classifying a killing as “justified” only
when actually “necessary to protect the peace officer or another from apparent death
or great bodily harm”), with MINN. STAT. § 609.066(1)(1) (2020) (inserting “if an
objectively reasonable officer would believe, based on the totality of the
circumstances known to the officer at the time and without the benefit of hindsight,
that such force is necessary”).
134. Jany, supra note 130.
135. Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs & Azi Paybarah, Protesters Clash with Police After
Minnesota Officer Shoots Black Man, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/11/us/brooklyn-center-minnesota-policeshooting.html [perma.cc/8PPJ-SNRQ].
136, Id.
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vowed to continue with the prosecution when his office took over.137
Though it appears more a case of ineptitude than savagery, this
case has many of the same racial, policing, and power elements of
Chauvin’s. And the likely result is another conviction. That would
be the right outcome; it would reinforce the sea change finally
evident in Chauvin’s case. The hope is that these tragic cases will
decrease in frequency, but when they do happen, the trend for
greater accountability will continue.
Against this backdrop it appears we are at a fulcrum in our
long history of racial inequity in the prosecution and sentencing of
police killings, and in the use of the felony-murder doctrine more
generally. Up until now, most frequently, officers who killed were
never even charged.138 On the rare occasions—two others in recent
memory in Minnesota—that a White officer was charged or
indicted, it was only to second-degree culpable manslaughter, not
felony-murder.139 A person of color is killed by police; the initial
public outcry dissipates; only in rare cases are charges brought;
then it happens all over again. Community leaders like former
Minneapolis NAACP president Leslie Redmond have expressed
their exasperation: “The 13th [Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution] abolished slavery except if one was duly convicted of
a crime. The legacy of slave patrols ha[s] continued through our
current policing system and it is time for a change. The murder of
George Floyd made people realize that silence equal[s] consent.”140
Considering that long history of tribulation, the community
rightly celebrated Chauvin’s convictions. But there is a reasonable
chance that the conviction to the top count, second-degree felonymurder, will not stand. The Supreme Court of Minnesota may
answer the call of academics and practitioners to reevaluate the
merger limitation to the felony-murder doctrine.141 The high Court
may hold that at the very least assaults—and possibly other felonylevel crimes of physical aggression towards a person—that lead to
an unintended death cannot predicate felony-murder. Such a

137. Amy Forliti, Minnesota AG’s Office to Prosecute Case Involving Wright’s
Death, STAR TRIB. (May 21, 2021), https://www.startribune.com/minnesota-agsoffice-to-prosecute-case-in-wrights-death/600059862/?utm_source=newsletter&
utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=talkers [perma.cc/TV9B-93ML].
138. Jackman & Barrett, supra note 126.
139. Indictment, State v. Krook, No. 82-CR-19-2887 (Washington Cnty. Dist. Ct.
2019); Criminal Complaint, State v. Potter, No. 27-CR-21-7460 (Hennepin Cnty.
Dist. Ct. 2021).
140. Interview with Leslie E. Redmond, Esq., Former NAACP President, in St.
Paul, Minnesota (Jan. 3, 2021) (on file with author).
141. Egan, Collateral and Independent Felonious Design, supra note 68.
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holding would be grounded in the following reasoning: because the
mens rea, or violent underlying criminal intent was common to the
predicate assaultive crime and murder in the abstract, the two
crimes merge.142
As horrific as his actions were, Chauvin did not intend to kill
Floyd. There was public outrage when he was not charged with
intentional murder,143 but Ellison and his team were correct to
conclude that intentional murder simply did not fit. Chauvin set out
to do something appalling: he likely wanted make Floyd fear the
power imbalance, likely wanted to hurt Floyd; perhaps he even
intended to make him beg for his life, or at the very least recognize
that he had the absolute power to take it away. Chauvin likely
further intended to whitewash all of this in a police report he would
have turned over to prosecutors to entice them to charge Floyd, had
he survived. He likely intended to make Floyd out as the bad actor,
maybe even the aggressor, just as peace officers have done across
the Twin Cities and across the rest of the country with impunity for
far too long. Even more appalling, Chauvin used the power of his
badge to try to do all of this. But none of this could be congruent
with an affirmative intent to kill. The Author is among the harshest
critics of what Chauvin did, but to assert that he intended to slowly
kill George Floyd in broad daylight amidst a sea of onlookers is
misguided.
As unsettling as this prospect is, and as much as Derek
Chauvin deserves a harsh penalty for the heinous murder he
without question committed, the progressive elements of the legal
community have to recognize that in many ways, Chauvin’s case
provides a sound factual scenario to finally rewrite Minnesota’s
felony-murder doctrine by adopting a merger limitation. Chauvin
was calculated and intentional in perpetrating an appalling and
wholly unjustified assault, but he did not intend to kill. Take away
the badge, take away the devastation Chauvin’s actions have had
on the community, take away his heartlessness, his violence, his
callousness, and his horrifying belief that he was untouchable, and
what is left is a text-book example of the type of prosecution that a
merger limitation to the felony-murder doctrine would preclude.
The law must be so clinical, so objective, and so dispassionate if it

142. Id. (providing thorough analysis of mechanics of felony-murder doctrine
predicated on assaultive crimes).
143. Harry Litman, Opinion, Does Third-Degree Murder Sound Too Mild for
Chauvin? It’s Exactly Right, L.A. TIMES (June 2, 2020), www.latimes.com/opinion/
story/2020-06-02/george-floyd-derek-chauvin-murder-charge [perma.cc/A797-5K3S].
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is to dispense justice on a broad scale, even when it seems
unpalatable in the short term.
Change in Minnesota’s felony-murder doctrine is long overdue.
But from a community, racial equity, and police reform perspective,
it would seem both shameful and tragic if this were to be the case
to finally deliver it. For more than forty years, the Supreme Court
of Minnesota and the State Legislature have turned a deaf ear to
calls for reform,144 silencing those who have suffered from a racially
and socioeconomically biased law weaponized against the
disenfranchised.145 Shameful, tragic, but not atypical: the world
finally listens when a White person of power speaks.
Chauvin’s legal team will invariably do just that by
challenging the felony-murder conviction with a call for merger.
Ironically, the unintended champion for a long-overdue change in
law that would benefit communities of color may now be this White
former officer who has wreaked such devastation on those very
communities. It is not just ironic; it is insulting and demeaning.
However distasteful it may be, Chauvin’s appeal has the potential
to finally cleanse Minnesota’s felony-murder doctrine of some of the
gross racial and socioeconomic inequity that has plagued it for
generations.
Peace officers are not the only actors who have perpetuated
the inequities of Minnesota’s felony-murder doctrine; prosecutors
and judges should not escape blame.146 As sickening as overturning
the most serious conviction against Chauvin would be, the
accompanying evolution in the law would facilitate justice, even if
prosecutors and judges were not ready. The outcry, tragedy, and
reform of the past year should leave their mark on these ministers
of justice, awakening them to the inequities of the felony-murder
doctrine and the way it has long been employed to defile
communities of color. But even if all that has happened in the past
year does not have that effect, a change in the law would drag
prosecutors and judges forward, whether they were ready or not,
because it would finally deprive them of a tool that—unconsciously
or intentionally—they have long weaponized against the
disenfranchised.147
So even if Chauvin’s felony-murder conviction is overturned,
George Floyd will still have had a lasting impact on the law and on
144.
145.
123.
146.
147.

Egan, Collateral and Independent Felonious Design, supra note 68.
Egan, Minnesota Needs to Change Its ‘Felony-Murder’ Doctrine, supra note
See supra Sections II & III.
See supra Sections II & III.
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the broader community in which it is immersed. Slow as the waking
of conscience may be, the tide is finally shifting. And that tidal pool
is deeper, and hopefully longer lasting, than just Derek Chauvin’s
legal case. Although only one of the recent Minnesota police killings
leading up to Chauvin has resulted in a conviction, all four cases
were brought in the past five years.148 On an unprecedented scale
in the wake of George Floyd’s killing, the streets have flooded with
sustained protest—both in Minnesota and around the world. 149
Their calls are for racial equity and police reform.150 And it has not
been without effect: the public has successfully demanded laws
aimed at fostering more effective relationships between the police
and the community, preventing police killings, and imposing
greater accountability when killings do occur.151 Moreover, leaders
like Minneapolis Police Chief Medaria Arradondo are now at the
helm. He immediately discharged all four officers involved in
Floyd’s death and promised, “The Floyd family will lead me
forward.”152 Finally, the aggressive charging of Chauvin,153 like the
general approach of Ellison and his team to this prosecution, are in
and of themselves promising.154 Things are starting to change.
148. Jon Collins & Riham Feshir, Two Minnesota Police Shooting Trials, Two Very
Different Verdicts, MPR NEWS (May 1, 2019), https://www.mprnews.org/story/
2019/05/01/two-minnesota-police-shooting-trials-two-very-different-verdicts
[perma.cc/HQ2G-J5HE].
149. Olivia Le Poidevin, George Floyd: Black Lives Matter Protests Go Global, BBC
NEWS (June 8, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-52967551.
150. Id.
151. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 299C.80 (2020) (calling for the formation of an
independent Use of Force Investigations Unit within the Bureau of Criminal
Apprehension to conduct officer-involved death investigations); MINN. STAT.
§ 609.06(3) (2020) (limiting choke holds and other restraints by peace officers); MINN.
STAT. § 609.066(2) (2020) (tightening restrictions on peace officers’ use of deadly
force); MINN. STAT. § 626.5534 (2020) (imposing a use of force reporting requirement
upon chief law enforcement officers); MINN. STAT. § 626.8434(3) (2020) (prohibiting
“warrior-style” training); MINN. STAT. § 626.8435 (2020) (establishing the Ensuring
Police Excellence and Improving Community Relations Advisory Council, which
legislators intended to protect civil and human rights, provide for citizen
involvement, and advance reforms that “promote positive interactions between peace
officers and the community”); MINN. STAT. § 626.8469 (2020) (providing for training
in crisis response, conflict management, mental illness crises, and cultural
diversity); MINN. STAT. § 626.8475 (2020) (imposing a duty for peace officers to
intervene and report “regardless of tenure or rank”).
152. Sara Sidner, Minneapolis Police Chief Vows to Reform Police Department,
CNN VIDEO (June 13, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/videos/us/2020/06/13/
minneapolis-police-chief-reform-george-floyd-sidner-pkg-nr-vpx.cnn.
153. Chauvin’s conviction under the second-degree felony-murder doctrine is rare
for peace officers, but squarely akin to what defendants of color have historically and
routinely faced. See supra Section II.
154. Libor Jany, Seeking to Show Pattern of Excessive Force by Chauvin,
Prosecutors Cite Incident with 14-Year-Old Boy Who Couldn’t Breathe, STAR TRIB.
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The Supreme Court of Minnesota may wrestle Chauvin’s
murder convictions away from the communities that rightly
celebrated them, but it cannot take away the reform, the unity, and
the dialogue that has grown over the course of this past year.
Moreover, when it comes to the felony-murder doctrine, the
Supreme Court of Minnesota cannot take away that conviction
without also taking away a tool that has been weaponized in the
legal system against communities of color for generations. The ideal
outcome is for Chauvin’s appeal to catalyze a dialogue about a
merger limitation to the felony-murder doctrine, but for the
Supreme Court of Minnesota to recognize that public policy
demands that his conviction stand.
There is momentum behind this outcome. The appellate
posture of the Noor case illustrates Minnesota appellate courts’
prism shift when it comes to killings by police generally. Although
not specifically enumerated in statute, a time-honored common law
requirement for Murder in the Third-Degree is that the killer’s
“general malice” involve “ill will” directed at someone other than
“the person slain.”155 The Minnesota Court of Appeals in Noor could
not have been any more flagrant in disregarding the long line of
binding precedent from the Supreme Court of Minnesota,156 instead
(Nov. 18, 2020), https://www.startribune.com/chauvin-prosecutors-cite-incidentwith-14-year-old-boy-who-couldn-t-breathe/573105501/
[perma.cc/2CWM-X8HP]
(detailing prosecution’s intent to introduce evidence of Chauvin’s prior use of
unreasonable force against a fourteen-year-old boy while “ignoring his pleas that he
could not breath”); see also Stephan Montemayor & Chao Xiong, Four Fired
Minneapolis Police Officers Charged, Booked in Killing of George Floyd, STAR TRIB.
(June 4, 2020), https://www.startribune.com/four-fired-minneapolis-officers-bookedcharged-in-killing-of-george-floyd/570984872/ [perma.cc/DV8T-GWJK] (announcing
Ellison’s decision to upgrade the charges to include second-degree felony-murder
within days of being assigned the case).
155. State v. Weltz, 193 N.W. 42, 43 (Minn. 1923) (enumerating “intentional
driving of a carriage in among a crowd, or the discharging of a gun among a multitude
of people” as “common illustrations”) (cited in State v. Coleman, 957 N.W.2d 72, 78
(Minn. 2021)). Coleman was handed down by the Supreme Court of Minnesota as the
Chauvin trial was in progress. Coleman, 957 N.W.2d at 72.
156. The Noor intermediate appellate court used tortured reasoning to reinterpret
time-honored, binding case law and statutory authority. See, e.g., State v. Zumberge,
888 N.W.2d 688, 698 (Minn. 2017) (“Third-degree murder cannot occur when the
defendant’s actions were focused on a specific person.”) (cited in State v. Noor, 955
N.W.2d 644, 654 (Minn. Ct. App. 2021)); State v. Hanson, 176 N.W.2d 607, 614–15
(Minn. 1970) (holding that Murder in the Third-Degree “occurs only where the death
is caused without intent to effect the death of any person, a phrase which under our
decisions excludes a situation where the animus of defendant is directed toward one
person only”) (cited in Noor, 955 N.W.2d at 654); State v. Lowe, 68 N.W. 1094, 1095
(Minn. 1896) (“It is, however, necessary that the act was committed without special
design upon the particular person or persons with whose murder the accused is
charged.”) (cited in Noor, 955 N.W.2d at 653). See also MINN. STAT. § 645.08(2) (2018)
(“[T]he singular includes the plural; and the plural, the singular[.]”) (cited in Noor,
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holding without ambiguity that “[t]he phrase does not preclude the
possibility of a third-degree murder conviction if an unintentional
death is caused by an act directed at a single person.” 157 A bold
stance this was for the Minnesota Court of Appeals, an errorcorrecting court not authorized to forge new policy.158 The Noor
appellate court made this ruling knowing that it would pave the
way for reinstating the Murder in the Third-Degree charge on the
eve of the Chauvin trial, which was already pending voir dire. 159
The intermediate appellate court’s legal reasoning was strained at
best. In sum, the Minnesota Court of Appeals acknowledged in Noor
the overwhelming weight of binding authority, then promptly
issued a ruling in direct contradiction to it. This is result-oriented
reasoning at its finest, and it demonstrates just how much the
cultural climate has changed.
It is significant that the Minnesota Court of Appeals was
receptive to this change in cultural climate. Noor suggests that
appellate courts will no longer be complacent in police abuse. As a
matter of public policy, they will now instead side with those
terrorized by it. On some level, this is a step in the right direction.
However, it is legally nuanced. What is clear is that the holding in
Noor seems to show the courts mirroring the growing public
intolerance of police killings. Not even the Minnesota Court of
Appeals is immune to the evolution George Floyd’s killing has
propelled this past year.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota likely will not be immune to
this evolution either. It will uphold both Noor, when it comes to
Murder in the Third-Degree, and Chauvin when it comes to FelonyMurder in the Second-Degree and Murder in the Third-Degree. It
will uphold these convictions against former peace officers even
though it requires making new law as it pertains to Murder in the
Third-Degree, and upholding bad law, at least temporarily, as it
pertains to Second-Degree Felony-Murder. To the extent that these
laws implicate excessive force by police, that is probably a good
thing. But the social dialogue and legal reform should not stop with
the analysis of the five prosecuted Minnesota police killings in
recent memory.
955 N.W.2d at 645) (using a mere general cannon of construction to attempt to
unwrite a well-established tenet of Murder in the Third Degree). The Noor court even
quotes the 1896 murder statute, emphasizing the words “design to effect the death”
to argue that somehow the plain language of the century-old statute invalidates the
requirement that the defendant endanger another person. See 955 N.W.2d at 655.
157. Noor, 955 N.W.2d at 656.
158. Jensen v. 1985 Ferrari, 949 N.W.2d 729, 741 n.21 (Minn. Ct. App. 2020).
159. Noor, 955 N.W.2d at 644.
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If the high Court does not forge new ground by adopting the
merger limitation in the Chauvin appeal, it should be vigilant not
to overlook a more appropriate case to reform the felony-murder
doctrine. Instead of protecting the White former peace officer who
violently betrayed the public trust, the case that ultimately propels
legal reform of the felony-murder doctrine should look more like
most of the convictions that have come through the system in the
last forty years. These cases have borne the mark of a tragedy, but
for opposite reasons: most convictions feature disenfranchised
people of color as defendants. They commit assaults, do not intend
to kill, and cannot hide behind a badge. These actors, though
certainly not blameless, have for years received the draconian
treatment that Chauvin will seek to sidestep on appeal.
The tragedy of George Floyd must not be compounded. Even if
his case exposes some of the faults of the felony-murder doctrine,
Chauvin does not deserve to be the agent of reform—not after what
he has done to the community. The conversation must begin here,
but the true reformer has yet to come forward. The time is ripe. We
are reexamining police killings; now we must reexamine the
weaponization
of
the
felony-murder
doctrine
against
disenfranchised people of color.
Prosecutors have analyzed the Chauvin case through a
different lens than past police killings. Hopefully, appellate court
jurists do too. Finally deploying a second-degree felony-murder
charge against a peace officer with success demonstrates this shift.
It took strong evidence. It also took a jury that had absorbed the
social evolution that has taken place in the year since George
Floyd’s killing.
The convictions will not repair the long-standing racial
inequities of the felony-murder doctrine—or of criminal
prosecutions more generally—nor will they completely halt the
onslaught of police killings in the Twin Cities and in the rest of the
nation and world. But they have already had some effect in making
peace officers reevaluate use of force. And regardless of what
happens in the appellate courts, the appeal will force a long-overdue
conversation about substantive felony-murder reform in Minnesota,
across the country, and hopefully in the few nations abroad that still
employ the archaic doctrine. This conversation will embrace
evolving norms about racial justice and policing. The convictions
and appeal will make prosecutors and judges more cognizant of
racial disparities that leave gaping wounds. They will reinforce
broader reform, rethinking, and unity. They will promote, solidify,
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and stand for justice both in our laws and in our communities. That
will be George Floyd’s legacy.

